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JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1961
DRAFTING A SECTION 2503(c) TRUST
FOR A MINOR**
By HovER T. LENTZ*
It is more blessed to give than to receive, and the more so, if the
gift is blessed by the tax laws. Paradoxically, the very solicitude
of the law in protecting minors and their property resulted in plac-
ing minors at a serious tax disadvantage insofar as the receipt of
gifts was concerned. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 has re-
moved several of the curses which formerly plagued would-be don-
ors and their counsel, and a favorable start has been made in foster-
ing gifts to minors by the extension of a partial tax blessing to such
gifts.
I. HISTORICAL AND CURRENT BACKGROUND ON THE FUTURE INTEREST
PROBLEM
Before analyzing the new provisions of the 1954 Code relating
to gifts to minors and attempting to draft a trust instrument quali-
fying for their benefits, it is necessary to examine the prior law,
first, in order to appraise and interpret the new rules, and, second,
because the new law merely extends and does not repeal the old,
and therefore much of the old is still to be reckoned with today.
Since its inception in 1932, the Federal gift tax law has provid-
ed for the annual exclusion of certain amounts from the category of
taxable gifts. Section 1003 (b) of the 1939 Code and Section 2503 (b)
of the 1954 Code allow an annual exclusion from gift tax in the
amount of $3,000 for all gifts "other than gifts of future interests in
property."
With the estate tax rates reaching as high as 77% and with in-
come rates attaining a maximum of 91%, both in steep progression,
the urge has been irresistible to reduce these tax burdens by gifts
of property to those objects of the donor's bounty who have smaller
estates and lower incomes. The objective becomes particularly at-
tractive if the goal can be attained without incurring a gift tax.
While the use of the $30,000 lifetime specific exemption' available
to every donor is important in avoiding gift tax, the full use of the
annual exclusion greatly increases the benefits to be realized from
gifts. Therefore, it is advisable, at least from the tax viewpoint, to
make certain that a gift is not denominated a "future interest."
The problem is essentially one of definition. The meaning of
the phrase "future interest" has gradually evolved through a long
series of decisions, an unusual number of which have been rendered
by the United States Supreme Court.
The Committee Reports under the Revenue Act of 1932 stated
that the term meant "any interest or estate, whether vested or con-
tingent, limited to commence in possession or enjoyment at a future
**This is a revision of an article by Mr. Lentz that appeared in the 1956 Major Tax Planning
volume, sponsored by the University of Southern California, published by Mathew Bender & Co.
*Mr. Lentz is a member of the Denver firm of Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard. He is
past Secretary of the Section of Taxation of the ABA and past chairman of the Federal Estate and
Gift Tax Committee of the Section of Taxation of the ABA.
1 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2521.
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date." The reason for restricting the exclusion to transfers of pres-
ent interests was said to be the "apprehended difficulty, in many
instances, of determining the number of eventual donees and the
values of their respective gifts."
In a leading case2 the Supreme Court remarked:
These terms are not words of art, like "fee" in the law of
seizin, . . .but connote the right to substantial present eco-
nomic benefit. The question is of time, not when title vests,
but when enjoyment begins. Whatever puts the barrier of
a substantial period between the will of the beneficiary or
donee now to enjoy what has been given him and that en-
joyment makes the gift one of a future interest within the
meaning of the regulation.
These various definitions, however, must be applied to specific fac-
tual situations. A veritable welter of cases has arisen, particularly
when one considers that the question is relatively insignificant
from a revenue standpoint. These cases dealing primarily with
gifts in trust have resulted in an illogical pattern, much of which
is still fully applicable under the 1954 Code.
It is the individual beneficiary, not the trustee, to whom the
gift is made and the annual exclusion is applicable.3 Where the
trustee was directed to accumulate the income and to distribute the
accumulated income and the principal at a future time, the bene-
ficiary's interest in both the income and the principal were deemed
future and the exclusion was denied. 4 Likewise, the exclusion was
lost when the trustee was given discretion to use income or principal
at any time for the benefit of the beneficiary. 5
Where current distribution of income was mandatory and only
the distribution of corpus was postponed to a later date, the courts
valued the income interest separately and treated it as a "present"
interest. The exclusion was allowed to the extent of the value of the
income interest, even though the gift of the principal was deemed
to be "future."6 The value of the income interest in such cases is
determined by actuarial principles under tables provided in the
Treasury Regulations.
7
However, even in instances where all income was required to
be distributed currently the exclusion was sometimes denied. Al-
most in vain, the donors sought for a magic formula for making a
gift in trust, particularly for the benefit of minors, which would
pass the "future interest" hurdle and at the same time avoid the
donor's natural reluctance to vest full control of the property and
the income in immature and inexperienced donees. One proposed
solution to this dilemma, which for a brief time had some promise
of success, was the inclusion in the trust instrument of a clause
granting the minor beneficiary or his legally appointed guardian
the absolute and unrestricted right to demand that the trustees pay
over all accumulated income and corpus at any time and thereby
terminate the trust in whole or in part. In the reported cases, not
one legal guardian was actually appointed for a minor. This device
2 Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18 (1945).
3 Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 398 (1941).
4 United States v. Peltzer, 312 U.S. 399 (1941).
5 Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 422 (1945).
6 Fisher v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1942).
7 Treas. Reg. §20.2031-7.
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generally met with failure and the Commissioner continued to deny
the exclusion.8 Recently, the Commissioner allowed the annual ex-
clusion under the 1939 Code where the trustee was required to use
trust income for the support, education and benefit of the minor as
though the trustee were holding as a guardian.9
The case law had reached such a discouraging state from a pros-
pective donor's viewpoint that text writers direly predicted, 10 and
the Commissioner contended, albeit unsuccessfully," that even an
outright gift to a minor was a "future interest," since the minor
could not be said to presently possess and enjoy a stock certificate
or the title to a parcel of real estate.
The taxpayer's plight clearly needed some attention, and since
resort to the courts had only produced further confusion, legislative
action was the alternative.
II. PARTIAL SOLUTION PROVIDED By CONGRESS
In response to this widespread confusion and dissatisfaction and
the accompanying demands for clarifying legislation, Congress acted
on two fronts. It adopted Section 2503 (c) dealing specifically with
gifts to minors, and it added some language to Section 2503 (b) to
eliminate the incongruous result of the Evans and Brody cases.12
Section 2503 (c) provides that a gift in a prescribed form to a
minor is excluded from the future interest limitation. Congress
failed to come directly to grips with the basic "future interest" prob-
lem, and merely delineated a certain limited type of transfer as an
exception to the general rule. The pertinent part of the statute
states that:
No part of a gift to an individual who has not attained the
age of 21 years on the date of such transfer shall be con-
sidered a gift of a future interest in property ... if the prop-
perty and the income thereform -
(1) may be expended by, or for the benefit of, the donee
before his attaining the age of 21 years, and
(2) will to the extent not so expended-
(A) pass to the donee on his attaining the age of 21
years, and
(B) in the event the donee dies before attaining the age
of 21 years, be payable to the estate of the donee or
as he may appoint under a general power of ap-
pointment as defined in section 2514 (c). 13
The statute was not intended to provide an exclusive method
of making gifts of present interests to minors. Therefore, prior law
will continue to govern transfers which do not comply with the
strict requirements of Section 2503 (c).14
8 Rev. Rul. 54-91, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 207.
9 Rev. Rul. 59-78, I.R.B. 1959-10, p.
44 
following United States v. Baker, 236 F.2d 317 (4th Cir.
1956).
10 Fleming. Gifts for the Benefit of Minors 49 Mich. L. Rev. 529 (1951).
11 John E. Daniels, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 147 (1952).
12 Evans v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 435 (3rd Cir. 1952); Jenny Brody, 19 T.C. 126 (1952).
13 See generally: Rabklin and Johnson, Federal Income, Estate and Gift Taxation, §51.11(4);
Mertens, Law of Federal Gift and Estate Taxation, §§38.02, 38.03 and 38.20 (1959).
14 Treas. Reg. §25.2503-4(c) provides: "(c) A gift to a minor which does not satisfy the require-
ments of section 2503(c) may be either a present or a future interest under the general rules of
125.2503-3. Thus, for example, a transfer of property in trust with income required to be paid an-
nually to a minor beneficiary and corpus to be distributed to him upon his attaining the age of
25 is a gift of a present interest with respect to the right to income but is a gift of a
future interest with respect to the right of corpus."
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It will be observed that the statute covers all types of gifts,
whether outright or in trust, to a guardian or otherwise, and that in
some respects the case law has been modified. For instance, it is no
longer necessary that income be distributed currently, as was the
case under the Fondren15 decision. However, there must be provi-
sions for invasion of principal, the payment of income alone not be-
ing sufficient. In this respect the former rule, exemplified by the
Fisher16 and Sensenbrenner17 cases has been rejected.
Regulations interpreting this loosely drafted statute were very
slow in forthcoming. Proposed regulations were not published until
January 3, 1957, and these were not finalized until November 14,
1958.
III. PROBLEMS
A necessary consideration in planning a proposed trust is the
choice of a trustee. Since the corpus of a Section 2503 (c) trust will,
at least initially, be small, the use of a corporate trustee will gen-
erally not be practical. Of course, from the tax standpbint, a cor-
porate trustee does not give rise to the many tax problems that pre-
sent themselves if an individual trustee is named. There are no ad-
verse income tax consequences if the donor is trustee. The only
situation where a donor-trustee will be taxed on the trust income is
when, and to the extent that, he actually applies trust income for
maintenance of the beneficiary, whom he is legally obligated to
support.'8 The fact that the donor possesses the power as trustee to
accumulate or distribute income does not result in taxing it to him. 9
Nevertheless, the property will be included in his estate for estate
tax purposes if the donor is the trustee. In order to qualify under
Section 2503 (c) the trustee must have full power to distribute all
principal, and, therefore, to terminate the trust. Possession of such
a power would sweep the corpus into the donor-trustee's gross
estate under Section 2038 (a) (1),20 which taxes trusts with a re-
tained power to terminate in the settlor. In common law states
there are no tax dangers in naming the donor's wife as trustee, ex-
cept that she may be taxed on the income actually used to support
the minor child, if under state law, the wife has a legal obligation
to support such child. In a community property state the wife should
not be trustee because she would be considered as a donor. The se-
lection of the minor beneficiary's adult brother or sister would pre-
sent no tax problems.
Clearly, the trustees can possess the required discretion to ex-
pend the income and principal for the minor's benefit. Such discre-
tion cannot be vested in someone in a non-fiduciary capacity, such
as the minor himself, his parent, another relative, his guardian, or
merely a friend.
An equally important consideration is the choice of property
to be transferred to the trust. Often it will be desirable to transfer
property which is currently non-income producing, such as closely
15 Fondren v. Commissioner 324 U.S. 18 (1945).
16 Fisher v. Commissioner, 132 383 (9th Cir. 1942).
17 Sensenbrenner v. Commisisoner, 234 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1943).
18 nt. Rev. Code of 1954, §677(b).
19 nt. Rev. Code of 1954, 4§674(b)(s), 674(b)(7) and 677.
20 Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953).
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held stock or land. This would appear to be permissible as long as
the trustee is not directed by the terms of the trust to retain such
property. Although urged to do so, the Treasury did not cover this
point in the regulations. Previously the Service has issued favorable
rulings to the effect that gifts to Section 2503 (c) trusts of life in-
surance policies and subsequent cash gifts to pay premiums thereon
qualify for the exclusion. Such rulings covered both policies on the
trust beneficiary's life and policies on the life of the parent of the
beneficiary. Recently the Service has decided to reconsider this
position. The statute states that the trust property and the income
therefrom "may be expended by, or for the benefit of" the trust
beneficiary. The issue now troubling the Service appears to be
whether a portion of the cash gifts attributable to the cost of pure
insurance and not reflected in an increase in cash surrender value
is an expenditure for the "benefit" of the beneficiary. It may be
necessary to distinguish between situations in which the life insur-
ance is on the life of the beneficiary's parent or on the beneficiary's
life. In the former, it can be argued that the funds were expended
for the benefit of the beneficiary, who is thereby protected against
loss of his parent, while in the latter the benefit may be to the bene-
ficiary's successors in interest or his heirs, rather than to the bene-
ficiary himself.
What standards, if any, may be imposed upon the exercise of
the trustee's discretion to distribute or accumulate income or to in-
vade corpus? The statute merely states that the "property and the
income therefrom may be expended by, or for the benefit of, the
donee." There should be no limitations or fixed standards on the
trustee's discretion. The proposed regulations would have allowed
standards of "support, health or education" provided that the exer-
cise of such discretionary authority by the trustee might not be ex-
ercised so as to deny the donee the right to the property or income
in case of "need." This was changed in the final regulations to pro-
vide that a transfer will not fail to qualify under Section 2503 (c) by
reason of the fact that-
There is left to the discretion of a trustee the determination
of the amounts, if any, of the income or property to be ex-
pended for the benefit of the minor and the purpose for
which the expenditure is to be made, provided there are no
substantial restrictions under the terms of the trust instru-
ment on the exercise of such discretion.
21
It is this failure to permit standards governing distribution that
means it is not possible for the grantor to act as trustee without the
trust being included in his gross estate under the Lober decision. It
may be argued that a discretion to use income and principal for sup-
port of the minor inferentially relieves the father of his support ob-
ligations and, therefore, benefits the father as well as the minor. In
such event the trust would not be solely for the minor's benefit, and
the terms of Section 2503 (c) would be violated. Further, if the
father is trustee and in such capacity he has the power to use in-
come and principal for his minor child's support, the father may be
deemed to have a general power of appointment for estate tax pur-
poses, since he can, by exercise of such power, discharge his obliga-
21 Treaq. Reg. §25.2503-4(b)(1).
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tion to support. The trust would therefore be includable in the
father's gross estate under Section 2041.
The most serious drawback of a 2503 (c) trust is the necessity
of completely distributing the trust estate to the beneficiary at age
21. Many donors will refuse to make such a gift, preferring the loss
of the exclusion to the vesting of substantial sums in the beneficiary
at that age. Consequently, there has been considerable thought de-
voted to various methods of circumventing this requirement. The
statute provides that the property "pass to the donee on his attain-
ing the age of 21 years." Final regulations rather clearly state that
a transfer will not be disqualified because "the donee, upon reach-
ing age 21, has the right to extend the term of the trust. ' 22 How-
ever, hopes that this would solve the problem were dashed almost
immediately by recent rulings.23 These rulings dealt with a trust
providing that upon reaching 21 the donee could either compel im-
mediate distribution of corpus or elect to extend the term of the
trust, in which case he would receive 1/3 of the corpus at 25, 1/3 at
29 and 1/3 at 33. It was originally held that the above quoted regu-
lation was designed to permit extension by the donee only upon
such conditions as the donee may freely choose. Therefore, the trust
did not qualify. In the later ruling the rationale was switched to the
theory that the donee had not been given "the unequivocal and un-
conditional right to receive the property without any necessity for
affirmative action on his part." While these rulings are difficult to
22 Treas. Reg. §25.2503-4(b)(2).
23 Rev. Rul. 60-218, I.R.B. 1960-23, p.12 superseding Rev. Rul. 59-144, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 249.
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square with the regulation, they clearly indicate the dangers of in-
cluding provisions extending the term of the trust after the donee
attains his majority.
What provisions should the trust contain with respect to the
disposition of the trust estate upon the minor's death prior to reach-
ing 21? The statute merely tells us that to the extent the income
and principal are not expended during the minor's lifetime, they
must be "payable to the estate of the donee or as he may appoint
under a general power of appointment." A provision for the pay-
ment of all accumulated income and principal to the minor's estate
is clearly sufficient. It is doubtful whether a direct transfer to the
minor's heirs or legatees, without actual administration of the assets
in the minor's probate estate, is permissible. While the statutory
language left room to argue that the grant of a general power to
appoint by will plus a gift over to third persons in default of a valid
exercise of the power would satisfy Section 2503 (c) (2) (B), it was
generally felt that such a result would violate the congressional pur-
pose to insure that no other person has an interest in the property.
In most states a minor can make a valid will, and thereby exercise
a testamentary power of appointment, if at all, only on reaching a
specified age, such as eighteen. Where the donee is under such age,
therefore, the takers in default will always receive the trust estate
at the minor's death. It was therefore feared that, where local law
prevented a minor from validly exercising a general power of ap-
pointment by deed or will, no gift over to a third person in default
of exercise of the power could be provided. Indeed, the proposed
regulations adopted this construction. Fortunately, the Treasury
heeded the many protests and the final regulations now contain the
following sentences:
However, if the minor is given a power of appointment ex-
ercisable during lifetime or is given a power of appointment
exercisable by will, the fact that under the local law a
minor is under a disability to exercise an intervivos power
or to execute a will does not cause the transfer to fail to
satisfy the conditions of section 2503 (c). Further, a transfer
does not fail to satisfy the conditions of section 2503 (c) by
reason of the mere fact that...
(3) The governing instrument contains a disposition
of the property or income not expended during the
donee's minority to persons other than the donee's
estate in the event of the default of appointment
by the donee.
24
Therefore, it is possible (and of course desirable) to give the minor
donee a general testamentary power of appointment and then make
provisions for gifts over to third persons in default of its exercise.
These regulations do not permit any restrictions of substance by the
terms of the instrument on the exercise of the power but do permit
formal restrictions, such as a requirement that the will must spe-
cifically refer to the power being exercised, that the will must be
24 Treas. Reg. §25.2503-4(b). In the only decision to dote construing §2503(c) the court denied
its application because the trust provided that the corpus would pass to the donee's descendants
or his brothers and sisters if he died prior to 21; the donee was not given any power of appoint-
ment. Bonnie M. Heath, 34 T.C. No.59.
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executed after the power was granted, that the document exercising
the power be filed with the trustee, etc.
There must be a separate trust for each donee. Several separate
trusts can, of course, be created by one trust instrument.
IV. SUGGESTED PROVISIONS FOR SECTION 2503 (c) TRUST
These provisions are drafted for a father who plans to create a
2503 (c) trust from his separate property for the benefit of his minor
daughter. He desires to name his wife as the trustee. It is believed
that the Service will rule that the following provisions meet all re-
quirements of Section 2503 (c) and the regulations thereunder.
A. Dispositive Provisions
Section 1. The trustee shall hold, manage, invest and reinvest
said property and any additional property which shall be added by
any person at any time in any manner to the trust herein created
for the sole benefit of (daughter of the settlor, born
). The trustee may distribute to, or apply for the
sole benefit of, , until she attains the age of twenty-one
(21) years, so much of the trust income or principal, or both, at such
time or times and in such amounts and manner as the trustee, in her
sole discretion, shall determine. Any amount which the trustee
shall determine not to use may be accumulated as income or may
be added to the principal, as the trustee shall deem best.
Section 2. When attains the age of twenty-one
(21) years, this trust shall terminate, and the entire property then
remaining in trust (both principal and accumulated and accrued
income) shall be paid over and distributed to her, free and dis-
charged of all trust.
Section 3. Should die before attaining the age of
twenty-one (21) years, this trust shall terminate on her death, and
the entire property then remaining in trust (both principal and
accumulated and accrued income) shall be paid over and distributed
to such person or persons (including her estate or the creditors of
her estate) in such amounts and proportions and for such estates
and interests, and outright or upon such terms, trusts, conditions
and limitations as may direct by her last will and
testament. Such general testamentary power of appointment shall
be exercisable only by her will which meets the requirements of a
will in the State of under the laws of such state in
force at the date her will is executed, which will is duly admitted
to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction, and which will re-
fers specifically to such power. So far as is possible, the laws of
such state shall govern the validity of interests created by the exer-
cise of such power of appointment.
Section 4. Should die before attaining the age
of twenty-one (21) years and without validly exercising the gen-
eral testamentary power of appointment granted to her under Sec-
tion 3 above, the trustee shall pay over and distribute the entire




(a) In equal shares free and discharged of all trust to
the settlor's children who are then living; provided, how-
ever, that if any such child is then under the age of twenty-
one (21) years, then in lieu of outright distribution of such
share to such minor child, such share shall be added to the
principal of a similar trust created by the settlor for the
benefit of such child and shall be held, administered and
distributed as a part thereof; and
(b) If none of such children is then living, then to the
person or persons who shall be appointed to administer
's estate, to be disposed of as a part of such
estate.
B. Irrevocable Trust
This trust is irrevocable and the settlor shall have no right
whatsoever to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate this trust, in whole
or in part. It is the settlor's intention that the trust income shall not
be considered his income for income tax purposes and that no part
of the trust shall be included in his gross estate for estate or in-
heritance tax purposes, and therefore, the settlor shall have the
right at any time to release, renounce, or disclaim any right, power
or interest which might be construed or deemed to defeat such in-
tention. Neither the creation of this trust nor any distribution of
income or principal hereof shall be deemed or considered to dis-
charge or relieve the parents of from their legal ob-
ligation to support and educate her.
C. Spendthrift Clause
The interest of any beneficiary in the income or principal of
this trust shall be free from the control or interference of any credi-
tor of a beneficiary or any spouse of a married beneficiary, and shall
not be subject to attachment or other legal process or susceptible of
anticipation or alienation.25
D. Powers of the Trustee
In the interest of brevity the general powers of the trustee
are not set forth. Commingling of trust assets with assets of other
trusts should not be permitted, nor should the trustee be authorized
25 Presence of spendthrift clause does not create a future interest. Rev. Rul. 54-344, 1954-2 Cum.
Bull. 319.
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or directed to retain non-income producing assets or to invest in
such assets. In order to avoid taxation of the income to the donor
under Section 675 and 677, the following restrictions on the trustee's
power are suggested:
The foregoing powers are subject to the following restrictions:
no loans shall be made without full and adequate security being re-
ceived and full current rates of interest being charged; all sales,
purchases, exchanges or other dealings with trust property shall be
made for full and adequate consideration in money or money's
worth; and no part of the trust principal or income shall be applied
to the payment of premiums on policies of insurance on the life of
the grantor. No person, other than the trustee, shall have or exer-
cise the power (a) to vote or direct the voting of any stock or se-
curities of this trust, (b) to control the investment of property of
this trust either by directing investments or reinvestments or (c)
to reacquire or exchange any property of this trust by substituting
other property of an equivalent value.
E. Manner of Making Distribution
The trustee may make any payments hereunder, directly to the
beneficiary, or to her legal guardian, or to the guardian of her per-
son, or to any other person deemed suitable by the trustee, or by
direct payment of such beneficiary's expenses.
V. OBTAINING RULING ON TRUST
Generally, a 2503 (c) trust will be used where the donor desires
to embark on a long term program of small annual gifts. It would
be most unfortunate for the donor to discover several years later
that the Commissioner refused to allow the annual exclusion. Not
only would back gift taxes and interest be due, but a new trust
would be needed for future gifts and, in addition, it would be neces-
sary to continue administration of the old trust. Therefore, cautious
counsel may consider the advisability of making a nominal gift to
the trust on its creation, and then requesting an immediate ruling
as to whether the trust qualifies under Section 2503 (c).
When making gifts of closely held stock, it might be advisable
to make annual gifts in amounts slightly in excess of the $3,000 ex-
clusion and accordingly pay a small tax in order that protection may
be claimed under 2504 (c) against a subsequent revaluation of the
transferred assets by the Service. This is particularly useful where
values are susceptible of wide differences of opinion between the
taxpayer and the government. Although the application of 2504 (c)
will not prevent a later claim by the government that no exclusion
was allowable in the prior year, the necessity of filing a return if
the gift exceeds $3,000 would commence the running of the statute
of limitations.
VI. SECTION 2503 (b) TRUSTS
In addition to treating gifts to minors in the 1954 Code, Congress
repealed the rule of the Evans case by inserting the following sen-
tence in Section 2503 (b):
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Where there has been a transfer to any person of a present
interest in property, the possibility that such interest may
be diminished by the exercise of a power shall be disre-
garded in applying this subsection, if no part of such in-
terest will at any time pass to any other person.
An example contained in the Finance Committee Report illustrates
the application of this language. Suppose a trust is created with in-
come payable to A for life, remainder to B, and the trustee is given
uncontrolled discretion to pay all or any part of the principal to A
at any time. Under the Evans decision, A's income right would be
a future interest, since its value is indeterminate in view of the
trustee's power to invade principal. Under 2503 (b), however, this
would be a present interest entitled to the annual exclusion. A's
income interest may be diminished by exercise of the power to in-
vade principal, but nothing passes to any third person. A possible
unintended result of this change, though, is that a trust permitting
discretionary accumulation of income will qualify in part as a
present interest, so long as no other person has any interest in the
property. Thus, the Fondren case may be legislatively overruled.
VII. NoN-TRUST GIFTS TO MINORS
Persons who have made outright gifts to minors without inter-
vention of a legal guardian, either in the face of or in ignorance of
the legal disabilities of a minor under state law, have generally
achieved favorable tax results.
Take the case of the father who gives shares of stock to his
minor child and registers the stock certificate in the child's own
name. It now has been settled that this transfer constitutes a pres-
ent interest. The Internal Revenue Service has put an end to the
uncertainty over outright gifts by ruling that "an unqualified and
unrestricted gift to a minor, with or without the appointment of a
legal guardian, is a gift of a present interest. '26 Since the child is
the actual owner, the child, and not the father, will be taxed on the
dividends and profits from sales, even though such income is used
for the child's support. The child will receive the income tax bene-
fits of his $600 exemption and the new dividend exclusion and credit.
The father can still claim the child as a dependent, if he continues
to furnish more than one-half of the child's support, until the child
is 19, and thereafter, so long as the child is a student.27 These tax
benefits should be balanced against (a) the inconvenience of hand-
ling the property; (b) the necessity of appointing a legal guardian
in order to sell the stock; (c) thefact that the father may reacquire
the property by inheritance if the child dies before attaining the age
where he can make a will; and (d) the fact that the child will have
complete control of the property at the age of 21.
Another father, in order to avoid putting title in the minor's
name, might give shares of stock to his child and register them in
the mother's name as agent or nominee for the child. Presumably,
this would constitute a gift of a present interest, but it might be
held to be a future interest if there are some conditions or limita-
26 Rev. Rul. 54-400, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 319; Beatrice B. Briggs, 34 T.C. No. 117.
27 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §151(e).
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tions on the mother's holding of title or on the application of the
income.
2
In the past few years a great deal of interest has been engen-
dered by acts concerning gifts of securities to minors. The Model
Gifts of Securities to Minors Act originally sponsored by the New
York Stock Exchange and the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act have
been adopted in almost every state. Briefly, they create a form of
statutory trust and eliminate the necessity of a legal guardianship.
If the securities are in registered form, the donor makes the gift by
registering the stock in his own name "as custodian for
a minor" followed by the citation of the statute. With bearer se-
curities, such as many types of bonds, the donor delivers the bonds
plus a deed of gift containing similar language to another family
member who will act as the custodian. Under the act the custodian
is granted full managerial powers. Generally speaking, the custo-
dian has powers and duties similar to a guardian of the minor's
property, but of course, without the necessity of posting bond or of
accounting to a court or of obtaining court approval of purchases
and sales and expenditures for the minor.
Transfers under these custodian statutes will qualify under
Section 2503 (c) for the gift tax exclusion, and the income from
the custodianship property will be taxed to the minor. If the donor
is also custodian, the property will be included in his gross estate
if he dies before the minor attains 21.29
By their terms, the application of such statutes is limited to
transfers to a minor by gift made after adoption, and their use is
limited to securities. (The Uniform Act also permits cash gifts). In
view of their simplicity, they may well prove more popular than
Section 2503 (c) trusts. However a properly drafted trust has the
following advantages:
(1) initial gifts and later investments are not limited to se-
curities;
(2) a broader choice of trustees and successor trustees is af-
forded;
(3) investments are not limited to the prudent man rule;
28 Madeleine N. Sharp, 3 T.C. 1062 (1944) (acq.); see Katherine Schuhmacher, 8 T.C. 453 (1947)
(acq.).
29 Rev. Rul. 59-357, I.R.B. 1959.44, p.18, holding that the income, estate and gift tax conse-
quences of the Model Act and the Uniform Act are the same.
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(4) provision can be made for a gift over to third persons rath-
er than to the minor's estate should the minor die before reaching
21, thus avoiding probate administration and possible return of the
property to the donor-parents through inheritance from the minor;
(5) accumulated income is taxed to the trust, not to the child;
and
(6) the uncertain application of various state laws (i.e. state of
the present or future domicile of the minor, donor or custodian or
state of incorporation of the company the stock of which is donated)
to the custodianship status are avoided.
Further, the cost of a 2503 (c) trust is not significant. The well-
advised donor will generally choose the trust for the reasons men-
tioned and its greater flexibility and individuality.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although Sections 2503 (b) and (c) represent an improvement
in the gift tax exclusion area, there is a need for further legislation.
The chief criticism against Section 2503 (c) has been directed to
its requirement that the property must pass outright to the donee
at twenty-one. There would appear to be no valid social or legal
reason compelling the selection of this age, and it is certainly con-
trary to the normal and understandable desires of most donors.
Some people feel that gifts to minors have now been granted an
undue advantage over gifts to adults.
The new language in Section 2503 (b) presents the anomalous
result that the longer the ultimate payment of principal is post-
poned, the larger the annual exclusion. For example, a trust grant-
ing income to A for life with remainder to B will have a larger ex-
clusion than a transfer where A receives the income for only one
year and then receives the principal, although obviously A has a
more valuable right in the latter case.
One possible solution is to grant an exclusion to all gifts where
no third person has an interest in the property. If such were the
rule, the donor would be free to fix the time for ultimate principal
distribution at any future date, whether the beneficiary be a minor
or an adult.
To accomplish this result, the American Bar Association has
suggested the following language in lieu of present Section 2503 (c):
(c) Certain Transfers not Considered Future Interests
No part of a gift shall be considered a gift of a future in-
terest in property for purposes of subsection (b) if the
property and the income therefrom will, to the extent not
distributed to or expended by, or for the benefit of, the
donee during his life, be payable on his death to his estate,
or as he may appoint under a general power of appoint-
ment as defined in Section 2514(c).30
In spite of this criticism, Section 2503 (c) with the liberal inter-
pretations of the regulations gives the lawyer a handy form of trust
for modest gifts.
3O H.R. R-p. No. 10591 §61, 86th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1960).
DICTA
